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  
Abstract—Data integrity is a term used when referring to the 
accuracy and reliability of data. It ensures that data is not altered 
during operations, such as transfer, storage, or retrieval. Any 
changes to the data for example malicious intention, unpredicted 
hardware failure or human error would results in failure of data 
integrity. Cryptographic hash functions are generally used for 
the verification of data integrity. For many Internet of Things 
(IoT) applications, hardware implementations of cryptographic 
hash functions are needed to provide near real time data integrity 
checking. The IoT is a world where billions of objects can sense, 
share information and communicate over interconnected public 
or private Internet Protocol (IP) networks. This paper provides 
an implementation of a newly selected cryptographic hash 
algorithm called Secure Hash Algorithm – 3 (SHA-3) on Xilinx 
FPGAs (Spartan, Virtex, Kintex and Artix) and also provides the 
power analysis of the implemented design. An FPGA is the best 
leading platform of the modern era in terms of flexibility, 
reliability and re-configurability. In this implementation the core 
functionality of SHA-3 is implemented using LUT-6 primitives 
and then these primitives are instantiated for the complete 
implementation of SHA-3. The Xilinx Xpower tool is used for 
power analysis of the implemented design. This implementation 
can be used with IoT applications to provide near real time data 
integrity checks. 
 
Index Terms— FPGA, IoT, SHA-3, Data Integrity 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In a public network, data flow between the IoT applications 
can be visible to a number of nodes on the network. Although 
data can be secured using encryption there may be a chance of 
data alteration on the network, whether the data is encrypted or 
not. This alteration can be catastrophic for the applications 
running at the destination node and can often lead to incorrect 
responses. For example, in a fund transfer if the hacker alters 
random pieces of data this may lead to incorrect funds being 
transferred, or even transfer to an incorrect account. Data can 
be altered due to many reasons; malicious intention, 
unpredicted hardware failure and human error in the network. 
With data integrity implemented data alteration can be 
detected, if the data integrity check is applied at the receiver 
side. This check can detect incorrect data transfer and therefore 
incorrect transactions or operations can be prevented.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hash functions can be used for the verification of data 
integrity. This is a one-way deterministic procedure whose 
input is an arbitrary block of data and whose output is a fixed-
size bit string, which is known as the hash value. The data to be 
encoded is called the message, and the hash value is called 
the message digest. In short, a message digest is a fingerprint of 
the data. If the data changes the fingerprint changes. In 
addition, if a secret is used in the process to generate the hash 
(called a HMAC) then no one can predict the corresponding 
digest of the data without knowing the secret and also the 
content of the hashed data cannot be determined from the hash 
value. This is why it is called a one-way procedure. 
The hash of the data is calculated and appended to the data. 
When the message arrives at its destination (in the case of data 
transfer) or is retrieved (in the case of data storage), the hash is 
recalculated from the data and compared to the hash that was 
appended to the original message. If the values do not match, 
then it means that the data has been altered. Fig. 1 shows how a 
HMAC is generated and compared using a shared secret K. A 
HMAC, a Hash generated Message Authentication Code can 
be used to verify both integrity of a message and its source. 
 
 
Figure 1. Secure Hash generation and comparison (HMAC). 
 
Commonly used Hash functions are SHA-1, SHA-256, 
SHA-512, RIPEMD, MD4 and MD5. In previous years 
Cryptanalysis of these algorithms has found serious 
vulnerabilities [1][2][3]. Although no attacks have yet been 
reported on the SHA-2 variants, but due to their algorithmically 
similarities to SHA-1, there are fears that SHA-2 could also be 
cracked in the near future. The National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST), USA announced the SHA-3 Contest 
in Nov 2007 [4]. This contest was to result in a new and secure 
cryptographic hash algorithm. This competition ended on 2
nd
 
October‟12, after the announcement of Keccak, one of the 
finalists of SHA-3 competition, as the winner for the title of 
SHA-3[5]. 
For the IoT applications, hardware implementations of 
cryptographic hash algorithms are needed to provide high 
speed and near-real time results.  ASICs and FPGAs are the 
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 two hardware platforms that can be used for these 
implementations. FPGAs offer numerous advantages for 
algorithm implementations over ASICs, such as: reliability, 
flexibility, low cost, rapid time-to-market and long-term 
maintenance [6]. 
 
Power efficiency is a critical issue in IoT applications, since 
the devices connected in IoT are often not connected to power 
directly and have to operate using energy harvesting sources or 
a single battery for several years without maintenance or 
battery replacement. So, the Xilinx Xpower tool is used for 
power analysis of the implemented design to have an idea 
about the power consumption on different Xilinx FPGAs. 
 
In this paper the LUT-6 (Look-Up-Table -6) primitives of 
FPGA are used for the SHA-3 implementation. The LUT-6 
primitive can be used to implement any function of 6-inputs. 
The logical function of the SHA-3 core is divided into two 
parts (1) 5- input XOR logic (2) 5-input Chi logic. The chi logic 
consist of XOR, NOT & AND logical operation. Both of these 
5-input logics are stored in a single LUT-6 primitive where the 
remaining input of the LUT-6 primitive is used as a control 
signal for the selection between the XOR and chi logic. For the 
complete implementation of SHA-3 a number of LUT-6 
primitives are used. 
 
Our proposed FPGA architecture is implemented on 
different Xilinx FPGA platforms. The implementation results 
on Artix-7 FPGA are better (because of the less static power 
consumption) for low power operations as compare to other 
FPGAs. The proposed architecture can be used with any IoT 
application to provide up-to-date data integrity check using the 
newly selected hash algorithm i.e. SHA-3. In this paper we also 
discuss some specific IoT applications to emphasis the 
importance of data integrity. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 
II gives details about IoT applications, Section III provides 
FPGA details and in section IV the SHA-3 algorithm is 
discussed. Section V is about the I/O interface for 
implementation. The detail of SHA-3 implementation is given 
in section VI. Power analysis is discussed in section VII and 
section VIII provides the Implementation results. Finally, the 
conclusion is presented in section IX. 
II. INTERNET OF THINGS APPLICATIONS 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is where millions of 
independent objects can sense, share information and 
communicate over interconnected public or private networks. 
These interconnected objects can collect data, analyze it and 
make decisions on the basis of the collected data. This is the 
world of the Internet of Things (IoT). In this mixed wired and 
wireless world there is a significant chance of data alteration at 
network nodes. So, without data integrity checks one cannot be 
sure about the originality/source of received data. This 
dilemma can be largely solved using HMACs. Let‟s have a 
look on some of the IoT applications.  
 
One of the important IoT application areas is a Patient 
Monitoring System. Continuous patient monitoring application 
requires the use of medical body sensors to monitor vital body 
conditions such as heartbeat, temperature and sugar levels. This 
application examines the current state of the patient‟s health for 
any abnormalities and can predict if the patient is going to 
encounter any health problems. The sensor data must be 
correctly received at the physician‟s network node as any 
alteration in original data may provide wrong information 
about patient‟s health there by leading to potentially fatal 
mistreatment of the patient. 
 
Crowd control applications will allow relevant government 
authorities to estimate the number of people gathering at an 
event and determine what necessary actions need to be taken 
during an emergency. The application could be installed on 
mobile devices and users would need to agree to share their 
location data for the application to be effective. Using 
location-based technologies such as cellular, WiFi and GPS, 
the application could generate virtual “heat maps” of crowds. 
These maps could be combined with sensor information 
obtained from street cameras, motion sensors and officers on 
patrol to evaluate the condition of the crowded areas. 
Emergency vehicles can also be informed of the best possible 
routes to take, using information from real-time traffic sensor 
data. Again we can see that if the application doesn‟t have a 
data integrity check, any corrupt data can lead to false 
information being received with potentially fatal 
consequences. 
 
The intelligent streetlamp is a network of streetlamps that 
are tied together in a WAN that can be controlled and 
monitored from a central point. It captures data such as ambient 
temperature, visibility, rain, GPS location and traffic density 
which can be fed into applications to manage road maintenance 
operations, traffic management and vicinity mapping. With the 
availability of such real-time data, government can respond 
quicker to changing environments to address citizen needs. 
Implementation of data integrity checks is again important for 
this application. 
 
In short, data privacy and security is very important and is 
one of the key challenges that need to be addressed before 
mass adoption of the IoT applications. In the IoT, a lot of data 
flows autonomously and without human knowledge, so it is 
necessary that the data received at the receiving node must be 
correct and unaltered from the transmitted data. To achieve 
data integrity and source authentication HMACs can be used 
with a shared secret (Fig. 2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Data Origin and Integrity check 
 
 III.  FIELD PROGRAMMABLE GATE ARRAY 
FPGAs are made up of an interconnection of logic blocks in 
the form of a two-dimensional array. The logic blocks consist 
of look-up tables (LUTs) constructed over simple memories 
that store Boolean functions. Each LUT has a fixed number of 
inputs and is coupled to a multiplexor and a Flip-Flop in order 
to build sequential circuits. Likewise, several LUTs can be 
combined in order to implement complex functions. The FPGA 
architecture makes it possible to implement any combinational 
and sequential circuit, which can range from a simple logic 
function to a high-end processor [7]. In order to reduce the 
complexity of designing FPGA systems, Hardware Description 
Languages (HDL) such as VHDL and Verilog HDL are used. 
Likewise, the vendor‟s synthesizer seeks for an optimized 
arrangement of the FPGA‟s resources based on the hardware 
description (particularly the content of the LUTs and 
interconnectors) during the process of mapping and routing in 
order to generate a bit stream, which afterwards is loaded into 
the targeted platform. 
 
Xilinx classifies their FPGAs in three series: Virtex (high-
end), Artix (low-power), and Kintex (low-cost). The Spartan 
series of Xilinx FPGAs is also low cost, but now this series is 
replaced by Kintex. 
 
In terms of power consumption, FPGA power is divided into 
two parts: static power (or quiescent power) and dynamic 
power [8]. Static power is the intrinsic power of the device and 
cannot be changed. It exists once the chip is powered on, even 
if there is no activity in the device. It includes transistor 
leakage, power consumed internally, and power dissipated in 
external termination resistors. Dynamic power is caused by the 
switching activity of CMOS transistors. Dynamic power is 
only consumed when the state of transistors changes, which 
depends on the specific implementation of the design. A design 
can consume less power if it is implemented in an appropriate 
way. 
 
Table I shows that the Artix-7 FPGA has similar static 
power consumption to the Spartan-3, but it provides a larger 
space and better optimized blocks. Table I presents the static 
power consumption and space/LUTs features of the different 
series of Xilinx FPGAs. 
TABLE I. POWER CONSUMPTION OF XILINX FPGAS 
 
IV. SECURE HASH ALGORITHM-3 (SHA-3) 
SHA-3[9] is a family of sponge functions characterized by 
two parameters, the bitrate r and capacity c. The sum, r + c 
determine the width of the SHA-3 function permutation used in 
the sponge construction and is restricted to a maximum value 
of 1600. Selection of r and c depends on the desired hash 
output value. Ex.: for a 256-bit hash output r = 1088 and c = 
512 and for 512-bit hash output r = 576 and c = 1024 is 
selected. The 1600-bit state of SHA-3 consists of a 5x5 matrix 
of 64-bit words as shown in Fig. 3. 
 
Figure 3.  State Matrix (A) of SHA-3 
 
There are 24 rounds in the  compression function (Core) of 
SHA-3 and each round consists of 5 steps, Theta (θ), Rho(ρ), 
Pi(π),  Chi (χ) and Iota (i) as shown in eq.  (1) to (6). 
 
Theta (θ) Step:  (0 ≤x,y≤  4) 
C[x] = A[x,0]⊕A[x,1]⊕A[x,2]⊕A[x,3]⊕A[x,4];        (1) 
D[x] = C[x–1]⊕ROT(C[x+1],1) ;                                       (2) 
A[x, y] = A[x, y]⊕D[x];                                                     (3) 
 
Rho (ρ) and Pi (π) Step:     (0 ≤x,y≤  4) 
B [y, 2x+3y] =ROT (A[x,y], r[x, y]);                                  (4) 
Where r [x, y] is the Cyclic Shift Offset   
Chi (χ) Step:(0 ≤x, y≤ 4)                                             
A[x, y] =B[x,y]⊕((NOTB[x+1,y])ANDB[x+2,y]);            (5) 
Iota (i): 
A[0, 0] =A[0, 0]⊕RC ;                                 (6) 
Where RC is the Round Constant 
 
In the above equations all operations within indices are 
done modulo 5. In eq. (1) A denotes the state matrix of 1600-
bits and A[x, y] denotes a particular 64-bit word in that state. 
B[x, y], C[x] and D[x] are intermediate variables. Other 
operations include bitwise XOR, NOT and the bitwise AND 
logical operation. Finally, ROT denotes the bit wise cyclic 
shift operation. The constants r[x, y] and RC are cyclic shift 
offset and round constant respectively and are given in the 
specifications [9]. 
 
The SHA-3 hash function operation consists of three phases: 
initialization, absorbing and squeezing. Initialization is simply 
the initialization of state matrix (A) with all zeros. In the 
absorbing phase each r-bit wide block of the message is 
XORed with the current matrix state and 24 rounds of the 
 compression functions are performed. In the squeezing phase 
the state matrix is simply truncated to the desired length of 
hash output. 
V. INPUT / OUTPUT INTERFACE 
To ensure and control the availability of input data at each 
rising edge of the clock cycle the Load and Acknowledgment 
signals are used. The length of the input data to be loaded is a 
64-bit word at each rising edge of the clock cycle. Similarly if 
the hash output is ready then it is indicated by putting 
hash_valid signal to a high logic and then the 64-bit word of 
hash value is available at each rising edge of the clock. The 
control path consists of a Finite State Machine, State register, 
clock and a counter. The data path consists of an Input register 
Serial-In Parallel- Out (SIPO), a SHA-3 Core and an Output 
register Parallel-In Serial-Out (PISO). The 1600-bit state 
matrix is stored in the 1600-bit register. The 0‟s are used in the 
initialization phase to initialize the state matrix with all 0‟s. In 
the absorbing phase each r-bit wide block of the input message 
is XORed with the r-bit current state matrix and then 
concatenation is used to combine r and c to form a new state 
and store it in the 1600-bit Register. The compression function 
is implemented using LUT-6 primitives. The round constants 
(RC) are stored in ROM using a 24x64 bit distributed ROM. 
Respective round constants are addressed during each round 
using the round number as the ROM address. In the last phase 
of squeezing the state matrix is simply truncated to the desired 
length of the hash output. The implementation of SHA-3 core 
(compression function) is given below in detail. 
VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SHA-3 CORE 
LUTs are the basic logic building blocks of an FPGA and 
are used to implement most logic functions of a design. LUT_6 
as shown in Figure 4, is a 6-input, 1-output look-up table 
(LUT) that can either act as an asynchronous 64-bit ROM (with 
6-bit addressing) or implement any 6-input logic function. The 
INIT parameter for the FPGA LUT primitive provides the 
logical value of the LUT and consists of a 64-bit Hexadecimal 
value. 
 
Figure 4.  LUT_6 Primitive 
 
It is obvious from the compression function steps that there 
are two types of logical operations throughout the compression 
function (a) XOR logic (b) χ (chi) logic. In this design we have 
stored the result of these logics manually in a single LUT_6 
primitive as an INIT value. The MSB of the LUT_6 input is 
used as a control bit for the selection between XOR and χ logic. 
If the control bit is „0‟ then XOR logic is selected and in the 
case of the control bit being a „1‟, χ logic is selected. The INIT 
value of the LUT_6 primitive is 64‟h D2D2D2D296696996. 
This is derived by using the truth table for all possible 
combinations of 6- input LUTs. 
 
The 1600- bits of the compression function are divided into a 
5x5 matrix (A) in such a way that each position of the state 
matrix contains a 64-bit word. All the bitwise logical 
operations are performed between these 64-bit words. So, there 
should be 64 LUTs to perform bitwise logical operation 
between any 64-bit inputs at a time. Because of this an 
architecture is proposed using 64 LUT-6 primitives with the 
same INIT value as shown in Fig. 5. In Fig.5 all the input bits 
are arranged in a way so that this architecture can be used to 
perform bitwise logical operation of either XOR or chi logic 
between any five 64-bit inputs. As the maximum number of 
inputs in eq. (1) to eq.(6) are five that‟s why the Fig.5 
architecture is suitable for the implementation of these 
equations and the remaining input can be used as „control‟ bit 
to select between XOR and chi logic. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  64 LUT_6 architecture to implement SHA-3 Core 
 In eq. (1) a 5-input XOR function is performed between the 
64-bit word of each row of state matrix (A). To implement eq. 
(1) the architecture of Fig.5 is instantiated 5 times with control 
bit equal to „0‟ to select the XOR logic. The output of this XOR 
operation is stored in an intermediate register of C[x]. 
 
In eq. (2) C[x] position is rotated 1-time in clock wise 
(C[x+1]) and anti-clockwise (C[x-1]) direction. The 64-bits of 
C[x+1] are also rotated one time. This rotation operation is 
implemented manually using concatenation operation. After 
this rotation operation, the rotated 64-bits of C[x+1] and 64-
bits of C[x-1] are XORed. To perform this XOR operation, 
again Fig.5 architecture is instantiated 5 times with control bit 
set to „0‟ and the output is stored in an intermediate register 
D[x]. This time only two inputs of Fig. 5 are used (excluding 
control bit) and the other inputs are grounded. 
 
 In eq. (3) the resultant D[x] is XORed with each 64-bit row 
of input state matrix (A) and the entire state of 1600-bits is 
updated. There are 25 rows of 64-bits in state matrix (A). So, to 
implement this XOR function, Fig. 5 architecture is instantiated 
25 times with control bit set to „0‟.  
 
Eq. (4) involves the bit rotation of each 64-bit row of the 
updated 1600-bit state of A[x, y] according to the bit rotation 
scheme of r[x, y]. After the rotation operation all the rotated 
bits are stored at new position. The rotation operation is 
performed by using concatenation. 
 
In eq. (5) chi logic is used that consists of XOR, NOT& AND 
logical operation. To implement this logic Fig. 5 architecture is 
instantiated 25 times and entire state of 1600-bit is updated. 
But now control bit is set to „1‟ to select chi logic.  
 
In eq. (6) only 64-bit of updated A[0, 0] are updated by 
XORring with 64-bit round constant (RC).  To implement eq. 
(6), Fig.5 architecture is instantiated one time with control 
logic set to „0‟. 
 
So, in this way one round of compression function is 
implemented within one clock cycle. The remaining 23 rounds 
of the compression functions are completed in the same way 
sequentially. Therefore, total 24 clock cycles are required for 
the complete implementation of the compression function. 
VII. POWER ANALYSIS USING XILINX XPOWER 
Xilinx Xpower [10] is a tool providing the power estimation 
for an FPGA design. The power of a design can only be 
analyzed after the process of “place and route”. Xpower 
calculates the power based on the switching activity of the 
transistors. Any component in an FPGA design with switching 
activity has a corresponding capacitance model used for the 
power calculation. There are two methods for power estimation 
using Xpower: (1) A rough estimation by setting an expected 
toggle rate; (2) A more accurate estimation by providing 
detailed transistor switching activity. Here, we choose the 
second method to get an accurate result for our designs. 
 
The flow for the power estimation is shown in Fig. 6, where 
the value change dump file (VCD) is a file to record the signal 
state at different timeslots and can be obtained by simulation. 
The switching activity of the circuit can be recorded in the 
VCD file when we simulate the gate-level netlist of the design. 
Another purpose of the simulation at gate level is to examine 
whether the register transfer level (RTL) code is successfully 
synthesized into the gate level netlist. Finally, Xpower reads 
the VCD file and generates the power estimation report.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Power estimation flow by Xpower 
 
VIII. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS 
Table II shows the implementation results in terms of area 
utilization, frequency of the implemented design, power 
consumption, throughput (TP) and TPA (throughput/area). We 
have implemented the proposed architecture in all Xilinx 
FPGA platforms to show which platform is suitable for use in 
the IoT application environment.  
 
The implementation results from table II shows that the 
Artix-7 FPGA utilizes less power as compare to the other 
Xilinx FPGAs and also consumes less area. Virtex FPGAs are 
power hungry, so these FPGAs are not suitable for IoT 
applications. The implementation on Spartan-6 consumes less 
power as compare to Virtex-6 but the throughput is less as 
compare to other Xilinx FPGAs. The throughput result on 
Kintex FPGA is better but it utilizes more area making its TPA 
less attractive. 
 
The throughput and TPA are calculated by using eq. (7) and 
eq. (8) respectively. 
 
                      TP = Block Size / (T. NCLK)            (7) 
TPA = TP / Area                      (8) 
 
The Block Size is the block size of the message in bits i.e 1088 
for 256-bit variant. T is the time period of the system clock and 
Nclk is the number of clock cycles required for a valid hash 
output. 
 
 
 
 TABLE II. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS ON XILINX FPGAS 
IX. CONCLUSION 
This work presents an implementation of the newly selected 
cryptographic hash algorithm called SHA-3 on Xilinx FPGAs. 
On the basis of the implementation results, the Artix-7 FPGA 
is recommended for the SHA-3 implementation as this 
platform is more suitable for IoT applications because of its 
lower power consumption and it also utilizes less area than the 
other devices. This implementation proposes a hardware 
architecture that is based on LUT-6 primitives. The logical 
functions of SHA-3 core are stored in LUT-6 primitives and 
these primitives are instantiated for the complete 
implementation of SHA-3. The power analysis of the 
implemented design is also provided by using the Xilinx 
Xpower tool. The authors believe that this implementation is 
suitable for high data throughput IoT applications that require 
data integrity and source authentication security services while 
still remaining power efficient. 
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    Device 
  Area 
(Slices) 
Freq. 
(MHz) 
 Power 
(mW)  
 TP 
(Gbps) 
 
𝐓𝐏𝐀 
[TP(Mbps) 
/Area] 
   Artix-7 
 
982  192.75   612 8.738 8.89 
  Virtex-6 
 
1,048 194.78 2026 8.830 8.45 
 Spartan-6 
 
1,162 111.73   823 5.065 4.35 
  Kintex-7 
 
1,185 213.17   629 9.660 8.15 
